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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a formalism for single-agent decision making that is
based on Dynamic Argumentation Frameworks. The formalism can be used to
justify a choice, which is based on the current situation the agent is involved.
Taking advantage of the inference mechanism of the argumentation formalism,
it is possible to consider preference relations, and conflicts among the available
alternatives for that reasoning. With this formalization, given a particular set
of evidence, the justified conclusions supported by warranted arguments will
be used by the agent’s decision rules to determine which alternatives will be
selected. We also present an algorithm that implements a choice function based
on our formalization. Finally, we complete our presentation by introducing
formal results that relate the proposed framework with approaches of classical
decision theory.
1. Introduction
Argumentation systems are based on the construction and evaluation of in-
teracting arguments that are intended to support, explain, or attack statements
which can be decisions, opinions, etc. Argumentation has been applied to dif-
ferent domains [50], such as non-monotonic reasoning, handling inconsistency
in knowledge bases, and modeling different kinds of dialogues, in particular
persuasion and negotiation. An argumentation-based approach to negotiation
has the advantage that in addition to the exchange of offerings, also provides
reasons to support these offerings. In this way, adopting this kind of approach
to decision problems has the benefit that besides choosing a proper alterna-
tive, the decision maker could also ponder the underlying reasons supporting
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the decision in a more understandable manner. That is, giving explanations
and justifications of the choices in terms of arguments is more informative and
more open to discussion and criticism than referring to a formula for a utility
function [65]. Therefore, the idea of articulating decisions based on arguments
became relevant to different approaches to decision making, such as decision
under uncertainty [2], multi-criteria decision [47], rule-based decisions [37], and
case-based decisions [15].
Following this trend, we propose an approach to single-agent decision mak-
ing based on Dynamic Argumentation Frameworks. Dynamic Argumentation
Frameworks (or DAF for short) were introduced in [55] and provide a formal-
ization for abstract argumentation systems where the current set of evidence
dynamically activates arguments that belong to a working set of arguments.
The main objective of DAFs is to extend Argumentation Frameworks [23] to
provide the ability of handling dynamics; for achieving that, at a given moment,
the set of available evidence determines which arguments are active and can be
used to make inferences to obtain justified conclusions.
In our proposal of an Abstract Decision Framework, a DAF is used for repre-
senting preference relations and the conflicts among the available alternatives.
Four other components complete the formalism: a set of mutually exclusive
alternatives which are available to the agent; a set of distinguished literals rep-
resenting different binary preference relations for comparing the alternatives; a
strict total order over the set of distinguished literals to represent the priority
among the preference criteria provided to the agent; and a set of decision rules
that implement the agent’s decision making policy. Taking advantage of the ar-
gumentation formalism, preference relations and conflicts among the available
alternatives can be considered for that reasoning. With this formalization, given
a particular set of evidence, the justified conclusions supported by warranted
arguments will be used by the agent’s decision rules to determine which alter-
natives will be selected. We will also introduce an algorithm that implements
a choice function based on our formalization. We will complete the presenta-
tion introducing formal results that relate the choice behavior of our proposed
framework to Classical Decision Theory [4, 39, 51].
In classical approaches to decision making, the objectives of a decision maker
are summarized in a rational preference relation, or in a utility function repre-
senting this relation. Despite the criticisms received, expected utility theory
has become ‘the major paradigm in decision making’ [58]. As suggested by Par-
sons and Fox in [48], this may be due to the solid theoretical underpinning that
numerical methods have; that is why they have stated that when developing
decision making models based on argumentation formalisms, a key issue is to
formally relate them to classical approaches to decision theory.
A particular feature of our approach is that the formalism is not attached
to any particular agent architecture. Since it is based on a dynamic abstract
argumentation framework, some elements of the formalism can be instantiated
with a particular argumentation system. Another feature of our proposal is
that using a DAF allows us to apply our framework to environments where the
scenario (i.e., the available evidence) can change dynamically.
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Next, we include an application example that will serve two purposes: to
motivate the main ideas of our proposal and as a running example to be used
in the rest of the paper.
Example 1. In this application the domain consists of a mobile robotic agent
that performs a cleaning task. In this environment, the agent has to decide
which box has to be carried next to a defined area called store. Boxes can be of
different sizes, can be spread over the environment, and each box represents an
alternative to be chosen.
STORE 
Figure 1: Running example: mobile robotic agent has to decide which box to move next.
The agent has a set P = {p1, p2, p3} with three possible preference criteria
to compare alternatives: p1 for representing that the robot will prefer to choose
a small box over a bigger one, p2 for representing that a box nearer to the store
will be preferred, and p3 for representing that the robot prefers a box that is
near to itself. A strict total order over these criteria is also considered: the
agent first will prefer boxes nearer to it, i.e., nearer boxes, then boxes nearer to
the store, and finally the smaller ones. Figure 1 shows a particular scenario of
our application domain where the robot has to decide among three alternatives:
box1, box2, and box3. Observe that box1 and box2 have the same size and both
are smaller than box3; box1 is closer to the robot than the other two; box2 is
closer to the robot than box3; box2 is closer to the store than the other two; and
that box1 is closer to the store than box3.
Consider a scenario as the one introduced in Example 1 where the robot is
faced with three alternatives. Following our proposal, as will be explained be-
low, this application domain will be represented with a dynamic argumentation
framework that will provide: a working set of arguments, a way of represent-
ing the conflict among these arguments, and a preference relation for deciding
between conflictive arguments. Then, the available evidence of a particular sce-
nario will be used to identify the arguments that are active, and these arguments
will be used to obtain justified conclusions with respect to this evidence. In the
situation of Example 1, as will be shown, our proposed framework will select
box1.
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As it was mentioned before, the use of argumentative reasoning for deci-
sion making has been studied in other approaches such as [3, 7, 27, 48]), and
the subject will be thoroughly analyzed in Section 6 where the related work is
discussed. In particular, [27] proposes a framework to represent the agent’s pref-
erences and its knowledge using Possibilistic Defeasible Logic Programming [1];
there, warranted information is used in decision rules that implement the agent’s
decision-making policy. In contrast to [27], we develop a more general proposal
since our formalization is based on an abstract dynamic argumentation frame-
work that allows the creation of different instantiations. Like [27], in this article
we propose to use decision rules and an algorithm for computing the acceptable
alternatives; however, both elements were reformulated with respect to [27].
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we will introduce the basic
concepts of decision-making from the point of view of the standard theory of
individual rationality, and the development of the contribution of this work
spans from Section 3 to Section 5. In Section 3 we will present the main results of
our approach which consists of an abstract framework for decision making based
on decision rules and dynamic argumentation; we will also introduce in that
section the formalization of the epistemic component of our abstract decision
framework. We will present the algorithm for selecting acceptable alternatives
in Section 4. In Section 5 we will lay down a formal comparison of the choice
behavior of the proposed framework with respect to Classical Decision Theory;
furthermore, we will discuss how our proposal is related to other significant
decision-making approaches in Section 6. Finally, we will offer the conclusions
and consider future work in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
We will introduce here a brief overview of the theory of individual deci-
sion making as presented in [39], where two related approaches to model the
agent’s decision are considered. Later on, in Section 5, the choice behavior of
the argumentation-based decision framework proposed in this paper, will be
formally related with these approaches to model the agent’s decisions.
The starting point for any individual decision problem in classical approaches
to decision making is the characterization of a set of possible (mutually exclu-
sive) alternatives from which the decision maker (an agent in our case) must
choose. Following the notation commonly used in the literature this set of al-
ternatives will be denoted by X. For instance, consider the example we have
already introduced (see Figure 1) where the robot has three alternatives to
select: box1, box2 or box3; in that case, X becomes {box1, box2, box3}.
In classical decision making approaches it is usually assumed the agent’s
choice behavior is modeled with a binary preference relation %, where given
{x, y} ⊆ X, x % y means that “x is at least as good as y”. As usual, from % it
is possible to derive two other important relations:
• The strict preference relation , defined as x  y ⇔ x % y but not y % x
which is read as “x is preferred to y”;
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• The indifference relation ∼, defined as x ∼ y ⇔ x % y and y % x and
which is read as “x is indifferent to y”.
It is customary to require the preference relation % to be rational (see defini-
tion 1) and this becomes a necessary condition when % is represented by a utility
function. The hypothesis of rationality is embodied in two basic assumptions
concerning the preference relation % as defined next.
Definition 1 (Rational preference relation). A preference relation % is rational
if it verifies the following two properties:1
1. Completeness: for all x, y ∈ X, x % y or y % x (or both).
2. Transitivity: for all x, y, z ∈ X, if x % y and y % z, then x % z.
The assumption that % is complete requires that the agent has a well-defined
preference between any two possible alternatives. Also, transitivity implies that
it is impossible for the decision maker to be faced with a sequence of pairwise
choices in which her preferences appear to cycle. For instance, following our
running example we can consider that the robot will prefer to select a box
that is near to itself, then, in the scenario described in Figure 1: box1 % box2,
box1 % box3, and box2 % box3.
Considering the choice behavior of a decision maker with a rational prefer-
ence relation % over X, when facing a non-empty set of alternatives B ⊆ X, her
preference-maximizing behavior will choose any of the elements in the following
set: C∗(B,%) = {x ∈ B | x % y for each y ∈ B}. Following our running ex-
ample, if we consider B = {box2, box1} then C∗(B,%) = {box1}, however, if we
consider B = {box2, box3} then C∗(B,%) = {box2}. If B = {box2, box1, box3}
then C∗(B,%) = {box1}.
It is a well known fact in decision theory community that completeness and
transitivity assumptions are usually hard to satisfy in real-world problems (see
e.g., [60, 64]), still the preference-based approach (PBA) is very relevant from
a theoretical point of view. In fact, this approach is the most traditional way
of modeling individual choice behavior. Nonetheless, the choice-based approach
introduced next is an interesting proposal which is a more flexible formal model
of theory of decision making, since it is based on entirely behavioral founda-
tions rather than being limited to consider individual decision making as an
introspection-based process.
The choice-based approach (CBA for short) [51] takes the choice behavior of
the individual as a primitive object which is represented by means of a choice
structure (B, C( · )) consisting of two elements:
• B is a set of subsets of X. Intuitively, each set B ∈ B represents a set of
alternatives (or choice experiment) that can be conceivably posed to the
decision maker. In this way, if X = {x, y, z} and B = {{x, y}, {x, y, z}} we
1In Order Theory, a binary relation satisfying these properties is called a total pre-order.
6
will assume that the sets {x, y} and {x, y, z} are valid choice experiments
to be presented to the decision maker.
• C( · ) is a choice rule which basically assigns to each set of alternatives
B ∈ B a non-empty set that represents the alternatives that the decision
maker might choose when presented the alternatives contained in B. Note
that C(B) ⊆ B for every B ∈ B. When C(B) contains a single element,
this element represents the individual’s choice among the alternatives in
B. The set C(B) might, however, contain more than one element and
in this case they would represent the acceptable alternatives in B for the
agent.
Example 2. Returning to the scenario shown in Figure 1 where X={box1, box2,
box3}. Consider the set B = {{box1}, {box2}, {box3}, {box1, box2}, {box1, box3},
{box2, box3}, {box1, box2, box3}}. Suppose that the choice experiment is B =
{box1, box3}. If C(B) = { box1} then box1 is the individual’s choice.
As in the rationality assumption of the PBA (definition 1), in the CBA there
is a central assumption, called the weak axiom of revealed preference (or WARP
for short) [57]. As it will be explained next, this axiom imposes an element of
consistency on choice behavior that is similar to the rationality assumptions of
the PBA. The following definition recalls the WARP axiom:
Definition 2 (Weak axiom of revealed preference). A choice structure (B, C(·))
satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) if the following property
holds: If for some B ∈ B with x, y ∈ B we have x ∈ C(B), then for any B′ ∈ B
with x, y ∈ B′ and y ∈ C(B′), we must also have x ∈ C(B′).
The weak axiom requires that if there is some choice experiment B ∈ B
such that x and y are presented as alternatives (x, y ∈ B) and “x is revealed at
least as good as y” (i.e., x ∈ C(B)) then there does not exist another choice
experiment B′ ∈ B where “y is revealed strictly preferred to x” (i.e., x, y ∈ B′,
y ∈ C(B′) and x /∈ C(B′)).
Intuitively, the WARP principle reflects the expectation that an individual’s
observed choices will display a certain amount of coherence. That is to say, in our
example, if given X = {box1, box2, box3}, B = {{box1, box2}, {box1, box2, box3}}
and a choice rule C, C({box1, box2}) = {box1}, then the axiom says that it
cannot be the case that C({box1, box2, box3}) = {box2}. In fact, it says more: we
must have C({box1, box2, box3}) = {box1}, or C({box1, box2, box3}) = {box3},
or C({box1, box2, box3}) = {box1, box3}.
As mentioned above, the PBA and CBA approaches present different per-
spectives of the theory of individual decision making. The former considers it
as a process of introspection while the latter makes assumptions about objects
that are directly observable (choice behavior) rather than things that are not
(preferences). In spite of these differences, under certain conditions these two
approaches are related. Below, we introduce a well known and important result
which states that if a decision maker has a rational preference ordering %, when
faced with a choice experiment, her choices will necessarily generate a choice
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structure that satisfies the WARP principle:
Suppose that % is a rational preference relation then the choice structure gen-
erated by %, (B, C∗( · ,%)) satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference.
3. Argumentation-based Abstract Framework for Decision Making
We will now introduce the main contribution of our approach: an abstract
framework for decision making based on decision rules and dynamic argumen-
tation. Later, in Section 5 our proposal will be formally related to Classical
Decision Theory.
Our abstract decision framework will integrate five components: a set of all
the available alternatives X that the decision maker has, a set of distinguished
literals that refer to the agent’s preferences, a strict total order over the set of
distinguished literals to represent the priority among the preference criteria pro-
vided to the agent, an epistemic component that will be used for representing
preference relations and conflicts among the available alternatives, and a deci-
sion component that effectively implements the agent’s decision making policy
based on decision rules. Next, we will define our framework and we will devote
the rest of this section to present the epistemic component, while the decision
component will be developed and explained in the following section. Since this
is an abstract framework, the representation language will not be instantiated;
however, we assume that this representation language includes constants, pred-
icates, and classical negation (¬). In our formalization, will refer to this base
language as L.
Definition 3 (Abstract Decision Framework). An abstract decision framework
for a language L, is a tuple 〈X, C, >C ,K,Γ〉L where:
• X ⊂ L is the set of all possible alternatives;
• C ⊂ L is a set of distinguished literals;
• >C is a strict total order among elements of C;
• K, which is referred to as the epistemic component, is a dynamic argu-
mentation framework; and
• Γ, called the decision component, is a set of decision rules.
When no confusion could possibly arise we will drop the subindex L from
〈X, C, >C ,K,Γ〉L to simplify notation. The epistemic component K, that will be
introduced next, will include evidence and arguments that the decision maker
will use for reasoning, and the set Γ, explained in the next section, will be used
for implementing the agent’s decision making policy.
Following our running example we can define the abstract decision frame-
work 〈Xr, Cr, >Cr ,Kr,Γr〉, with the set of alternatives Xr = {box1, box2, box3}.
The epistemic component Kr (explained in detail below) will contain evidence
obtained from the domain (e.g., smaller(box1, box3), smaller(box2, box3)) and
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arguments for and against considering one box better than another one. These
arguments will be considered by the dynamic argumentation framework to ob-
tain the agent’s conclusions (e.g., better(box1, box3)). This epistemic component
provides a knowledge representation tool that allows for the representation of
preferences and conflicts among the agent’s available alternatives.
In what follows, we will explain how to formalize the epistemic component
of our abstract decision framework using a Dynamic Argumentation Frame-
work. DAFs were introduced in [55] and provide a formalization for abstract
argumentation systems where the current set of evidence dynamically activates
arguments that belong to a working set of arguments. DAFs have been defined
as a specialization of Dung’s argumentation framework (AF) [23], with the main
objective of extending AFs to handle dynamics. To cope with this, at any given
moment, the set of available evidence will determine which arguments are active
becoming usable in producing inferences. In contrast, in Dung’s approach the
consideration of a changing set of active arguments would involve passing from
a framework to another. To keep our presentation as self-contained as possi-
ble, we refer the interest reader to our Appendix where a concise but complete
description of DAFs is included.
The remainder of this section will be dedicated to explain how to build a
particular DAF that will formalize the epistemic component for our abstract de-
cision framework that will be responsible of obtaining the agents’ conclusions.
This component will consider all the evidence the agent is in possession regard-
ing the current situation of environment which can change dynamically upon
perception; different instances of this set of evidence will determine different in-
stances of the DAF. The epistemic component will also handle the working set
of arguments the decision maker will use for reasoning to obtain conclusions; for
that reason, preference relations and conflicts among the available alternatives
should be considered. The working set of arguments contains every argument
that could be available to be used in the reasoning process. According to the
available set of evidence, there is a subset of this working set that contains the
arguments that are active in function of the currently present evidence.
In order to make a decision an agent equiped with our framework may have
at its disposal one or more preference criteria which will be used to compare
the alternatives in X; an important requirement is that no preference criterion
generates cyclic preferences. All these preference criteria will be considered to
define the preference function pref for the DAF of the epistemic component.
Example 3. Continuing with our running example, we will consider three pref-
erence criteria: the robot prefers to choose a small box over a bigger one, the
robot prefers to choose a box nearer to the store over a box far to store, and the
robot prefers to choose a box that is near to itself.
In our framework, each preference criterion will be associated with a literal
in L. These literals will be called distinguished as defined next.
Definition 4 (Set of distinguished literals). Let X be a set of alternatives.
The set of distinguished literals C = {c1, . . . , cn} is a non-empty set of literals
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from L. Each literal in C represents a different binary preference relation for
comparing alternatives in X.
Given a distinguished literal c ∈ C and x, y ∈ X then c(x, y) means that “x is
preferred to y with respect to the preference criterion c”. Consider the compar-
ison criteria mentioned in Example 3, in our running example the set of distin-
guished literals will be Cr = {nearer robot, nearer store, smaller}; thus, con-
sidering the scenario depicted in Figure 1, it holds smaller(box1, box3). In our
formalization, the literal same att(x, y) states that alternatives x, y ∈ X have
the same attribute values with respect to every c ∈ C; e.g., same att(box4, box5)
means that the two boxes have the same attributes for each preference criterion
of the agent. Note that in our running example (Figure 1) there are no pair
of alternatives with the same attribute values; however, in Example 8 below
we will introduce a scenario where there are two boxes with the same attribute
values for all the preference criteria.
Since an agent can have more than one preference criterion represented by
elements of the set of distinguished literals C, then in our formalization we
consider a strict total order >C among these elements. If the pair (c′, c) ∈ >C
then the criterion represented by the distinguished literal c′ is considered better
than the one represented by c.
Example 4. Consider the comparison criteria mentioned in Example 3. Then,
for our running example the set of distinguished literals is Cr = {nearer robot,
nearer store, smaller}. We will use the following total order for representing
the agent’s preferences among Cr:
>Cr= {(nearer robot, nearer store), (nearer robot, smaller),
(nearer store, smaller)}.
That is, in our running example the agent will have three criteria available, and
it will prefer first its nearer boxes, then boxes nearer to the store, and finally
the smaller ones.
Next, in Definition 5, we will introduce the formalization of the epistemic
component K of Definition 3 with a particular DAF described as 〈E,W, ./, pref〉.
In a DAF (see the Appendix), the set of evidence E may change dynamically
upon perception, and different instances of this set will determine different in-
stances of the DAF; thus, for a given set E there will be a subset of the working
set of arguments W that contains the arguments that are active. In our ap-
proach, the set E will contain a snapshot of all the information relative to the
current relations among the alternatives of the set X with respect to the pref-
erence criteria represented in C, e.g., nearer robot(box1, box2) belongs to the
evidence in the scenario depicted in Figure 1.
The working set W will contain arguments for reasoning about when an
alternative is better than other. Note that in a DAF, an argument A is a rea-
soning step for a claim α from a set of premises {β1, . . . , βn} denoted as the
pair 〈{β1, . . . , βn}, α〉. An argument will be active if its premises are satisfied
based on the current evidence. Given an evidence set E, an argument’s premise
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is satisfied whether it belongs to E, or it is the conclusion of an active argu-
ment according to E. In this DAF the set ./ will contain the conflicts among
arguments in W . Given an argument A ∈W , cl(A) denotes the claim of A and
cl(A) represents the complement of cl(A) with respect to negation (¬). Finally,
the preference function pref will consider all the agents’ criteria represented in
C, and, if it is possible, it will return the argument that is based on a better
distinguished literal with respect to the order >C . Since our epistemic com-
ponent is defined in an abstract form, the function pref is defined in terms of
argumental structures (denoted with Σ) which are built with one or more argu-
ments from W (see Appendix). In order to compare two argumental structures,
distinguished literals will be used.
Definition 5 (Epistemic component). Let X be the set of all the possible can-
didate alternatives, C be a set of distinguished literals in L and >C be a strict
total order over C. An epistemic component K, is a DAF 〈E,W, ./, pref〉 where:
 The evidence E is a consistent set of sentences of the form same att(x, y)
or c(x, y), such that x, y ∈ X and c ∈ C.
 The working set W will be such that if c ∈ C, {x, y} ⊆ X (x 6= y) and
better 6∈ C then:
〈{c(x, y)}, better(x, y)〉 ∈W
〈{c(x, y)},¬better(y, x)〉 ∈W
〈{c(y, x)}, better(y, x)〉 ∈W
〈{c(y, x)},¬better(x, y)〉 ∈W
〈{same att(x, y)},¬better(x, y)〉 ∈W
〈{same att(x, y)},¬better(y, x)〉 ∈W
 ./= {(A,B)|{A,B} ⊆W, cl(A) = cl(B)}.
 Let Σ1 and Σ2 be two argumental structures in W , then
pref(Σ1,Σ2) =
 Σ1 if ∀c ∈ dlits(Σ2), ∃c
′ ∈ dlits(Σ1) st. (c′, c) ∈>C ,
Σ2 if ∀c ∈ dlits(Σ1), ∃c′ ∈ dlits(Σ2) st. (c′, c) ∈>C
 otherwise
where dlits(Σ) ⊆ C is the set of distinguished literals that are contained in
arguments of an argumental structure Σ.
In the preceding definition, each argument in W has a set of premises containing
only one element: a distinguished literal c ∈ C comparing alternatives x, y ∈ X,
such that c(x, y) means that “x is preferred to y”; or a literal same att(x, y) stat-
ing that alternatives x, y ∈ X have the same attribute values for each preference
criterion provided to the agent. Given a pair of alternatives x, y ∈ X (x 6= y), the
conclusion of each argument in W states that: “x is better than y” (better(x, y))
or “x is not better than y” (¬better(x, y)) or “y is better than x” (better(y, x))
or “y is not better than x” (¬better(y, x)).
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A Dynamic Argumentation Framework imposes that all arguments must be
coherent, that is, any argument A in W must satisfy: cl(A) /∈ pr(A), cl(A) /∈ E,
cl(A) /∈ pr(A), and cl(A) /∈ E (see Definition 11 in Appendix). The following
proposition shows that in an epistemic framework built as stated by Definition 5,
since the literal better 6∈ C, all arguments in the working set are coherent.
Proposition 1. Given an epistemic component K = 〈E,W, ./, pref〉, all the
arguments in W are coherent.
Proof. Straightforward from Definition 5.
As it is explained in detail in the Appendix, when two arguments are in
conflict, the function pref will determine which one is a defeater of the other.
Then, an argument will be warranted with respect to a DAF if it has no war-
ranted defeater. A conclusion is justified if it is the conclusion of a warranted
argument.
Example 5. Consider the running example where Xr = {box1, box2, box3}.
In Example 4, we have introduced the set Cr = {nearer robot, nearer store,
smaller} and >Cr = {(nearer robot, nearer store), (nearer robot, smaller),
(nearer store, smaller)}. Then, Kr = 〈Er,Wr, ./r, prefr〉 is the epistemic com-
ponent for the scenario depicted in Figure 1 (where the robot r is currently
involved) with the following set of evidence:
Er =

smaller(box1, box3), nearer store(box2, box3),
smaller(box2, box3), nearer robot(box1, box2),
nearer store(box1, box3), nearer robot(box1, box3),
nearer store(box2, box1), nearer robot(box2, box3)

Given the set of alternatives Xr and the distinguished literals Cr, then, fol-
lowing Definition 5, the working set Wr has forty-two arguments that are de-
picted with triangles in Figure 2. White triangles denote the subset of Wr which
are active with respect to Er, and black triangles are the inactive arguments
of Wr with respect to Er. The text above each triangle is the conclusion of the
argument, and the text below a triangle is its premise. The label inside white tri-
angles will be used for referencing the argument along the paper. A solid arrow
that connects two active arguments represents that the argument at the begin-
ning of the arrow defeats (see Definition 15 in the Appendix) the argument at
the arrow’s end. In Figure 2, same att, smaller, nearer store, nearer robot,
better, ¬better, box1, box2, box3 are abbreviated as: sa, sm, ns, nr, b, ¬b, 1, 2
and 3 respectively.
Given the working set Wr depicted in Figure 2 and considering the evidence
set Er we obtain the following list of active arguments:
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A1 
b(1, 3) 
sm(1, 3) 
A2 
¬b(3, 1) 
sm(1, 3) 
b(1, 2) 
sm(1, 2) 
¬b(2, 1) 
sm(1, 2) 
b(2, 1) 
sm(2, 1) 
¬b(1, 2) 
sm(2, 1) 
¬b(1, 2) 
sa(1, 2) 
¬b(2, 1) 
sa(1, 2) 
b(3, 1) 
sm(3, 1) 
¬b(1, 3) 
sm(3, 1) 
¬b(1, 3) 
sa(1, 3) 
¬b(3, 1) 
sa(1, 3) 
A3 
b(2, 3) 
sm(2, 3) 
A4 
¬b(3, 2) 
sm(2, 3) 
b(3, 2) 
sm(3, 2) 
¬b(2, 3) 
sm(3, 2) 
¬b(2, 3) 
sa(2, 3) 
¬b(3, 2) 
sa(2, 3) 
b(1, 2) 
ns(1, 2) 
¬b(2, 1) 
ns(1, 2) 
A5 
b(2, 1) 
ns(2, 1) 
A6 
¬b(1, 2) 
ns(2, 1) 
A7 
b(1, 3) 
ns(1, 3) 
A8 
¬b(3, 1) 
ns(1, 3) 
b(3, 1) 
ns(3, 1) 
¬b(1, 3) 
ns(3, 1) 
A9 
b(2, 3) 
ns(2, 3) 
A10 
¬b(3, 2) 
ns(2, 3) 
b(3, 2) 
ns(3, 2) 
¬b(2, 3) 
ns(3, 2) 
A11 
b(1, 2) 
nr(1, 2) 
A12 
¬b(2, 1) 
nr(1, 2) 
b(2, 1) 
nr(2, 1) 
¬b(1, 2) 
nr(2, 1) 
A13 
b(1, 3) 
nr(1, 3) 
A14 
¬b(3, 1) 
nr(1, 3) 
b(3, 1) 
nr(3, 1) 
¬b(1, 3) 
nr(3, 1) 
A15 
b(2, 3) 
nr(2, 3) 
A16 
¬b(3, 2) 
nr(2, 3) 
b(3, 2) 
nr(3, 2) 
¬b(2, 3) 
nr(3, 2) 
Figure 2: Active and inactive arguments from the working set Wr of Example 5.
A1 = 〈{smaller(box1, box3)}, better(box1, box3)〉,
A3 = 〈{smaller(box2, box3)}, better(box2, box3)〉,
A5 = 〈{nearer store(box2, box1)}, better(box2, box1)〉,
A7 = 〈{nearer store(box1, box3)}, better(box1, box3)〉,
A9 = 〈{nearer store(box2, box3)}, better(box2, box3)〉,
A11 = 〈{nearer robot(box1, box2)}, better(box1, box2)〉,
A13 = 〈{nearer robot(box1, box3)}, better(box1, box3)〉,
A15 = 〈{nearer robot(box2, box3)}, better(box2, box3)〉,
A2 = 〈{smaller(box1, box3)},¬better(box3, box1)〉,
A4 = 〈{smaller(box2, box3)},¬better(box3, box2)〉,
A6 = 〈{nearer store(box2, box1)},¬better(box1, box2)〉,
A8 = 〈{nearer store(box1, box3)},¬better(box3, box1)〉,
A10 = 〈{nearer store(box2, box3)},¬better(box3, box2)〉,
A12 = 〈{nearer robot(box1, box2)},¬better(box2, box1)〉,
A14 = 〈{nearer robot(box1, box3)},¬better(box3, box1)〉,
A16 = 〈{nearer robot(box2, box3)},¬better(box3, box2)〉.
In the list above, those active arguments supporting that an alternative is better
than other appear first and those supporting that an alternative is not better
than other appear later. Note that the only conflicts among active arguments
are ./r= {(A6,A11), (A11,A6), (A5,A12), (A12, A5)}.
Observe that argument A11 supports that box1 is better than box2, based on
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the premise that box1 is nearer to the robot than box2; whereas A6 supports
that box1 is not better than box2 based on the premise that box2 is nearer to
the store than box1. In the particular case of our running example, all argu-
mental structures have only one argument which has one distinguished literal as
a premise, hence, for all arguments Ai ∈ Wr, the set dlits(Ai) will be a sin-
gleton. For instance: dlits(A6) = {nearer store(box2, box1)} and dlits(A11) =
{nearer robot(box1, box2)}. Since (nearer robot, nearer store) ∈ >Cr ( i.e., the
robot prefers to carry boxes near to itself than boxes close to the store) then,
prefr(A11,A6) = A11. Thus, A11 defeats A6 but A6 does not defeat A11 (see
Definition 15). Therefore, A11 is warranted in Kr and hence, the conclusion
better(box1, box2) is justified in Kr.
Arguments A5 and A12 are also in conflict, and we have that dlits(A5) =
{nearer store(box2, box1)} and dlits(A12) = {nearer robot(box1, box2)}. Since
(nearer robot, nearer store) ∈ >Cr then, prefr(A5,A12) = A12; hence, A12
defeats A5, and A12 is thus warranted in Kr and ¬better(box2, box1) is justified
in Kr.
Finally, note that the active arguments A1, A2, A3, A4, A7, A8, A9, A10,
A13, A14, A15, A16 are not in conflict with any other active argument, and
therefore, they are all warranted. Observe that one conclusion can be supported
by more than one argument. For instance, A1, A7 and A13 are three warranted
arguments that support the same conclusion: better(box1, box3). Then, from the
warranted arguments mentioned above, the set of justified conclusions in Kr is
{ better(box1, box3), better(box2, box3), better(box1, box2), ¬better(box3, box1),
¬better(box3, box2), ¬better(box2, box1) }.
We have shown in Example 5 that given a working set of arguments Wr,
the available evidence Er will determine a set Activer ⊆ Wr with the current
set of active arguments. Then, the conflict relation ./r and the preference
function prefr are used for determining the set Warrantedr ⊆ Activer of the
current warranted arguments. We will introduce next the decision component
of our framework; this component will use the justified conclusions supported
by arguments in Warrantedr to determine which alternatives will be selected.
4. Accepting alternatives
We will formalize now the decision component Γ of our proposed abstract
decision framework 〈X, C, >C ,K,Γ〉L, and we will propose an algorithm for com-
puting the selecting alternatives. As we have mentioned, the decision component
is a set of decision rules that will effectively implement the agent’s decision mak-
ing policy. Decision rules [27], that will be used to decide among alternatives
from a choice experiment B ⊆ X, are formalized in following definition.
Definition 6 (Decision rule). Let X be a set of alternatives and B ⊆ X be a
choice experiment (B 6= ∅). A decision rule is denoted (D B⇐ P, T ), where D ⊆
B represents the set of alternatives that this rule will select, P ⊆ L represents
preconditions for using this rule, and T ⊆ L represents the constraints that the
rule has for its usage.
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A decision rule “D
B⇐ P, T” can be read as “if all the preconditions included
in P hold and no constraint of the set T holds then D is the subset of alternatives
from B to be selected”. Hence, D will represent those alternatives that this rule
decides to adopt from the choice experiment B posed to the decision maker.
The following definition introduces our proposed decision component.
Definition 7 (Decision component). Given a set of alternatives B ⊆ X, and
the schematic variables W , Y , and Z. The decision component is the set Γ =
DR1 ∪DR2, where:
 DR1 is a set of decision rules obtained instantiating the variables W,Y,
and Z with constants from B in the decision rule
{W} B⇐ {better(W,Y )}, {better(Z,W )}
 DR2 is a set of decision rules obtained instantiating the variables W,Y,
and Z with constants from B in the decision rule
{W,Y } B⇐ {¬better(W,Y ),¬better(Y,W )}, {better(Z,W ), better(Z, Y )}
On the one hand, a decision rule in the set DR1 states that an alternative
W ∈ B will be chosen, if W is better than another alternative Y and there is
no better alternative Z than W . On the other hand, a decision rule in the set
DR2 states that two alternatives W and Y will be chosen when W and Y have
the same attributes, and there is not other alternative Z better than them.
The following definition states when a decision rule will be applicable with
respect to a particular scenario which will be represented by the epistemic com-
ponent K.
Definition 8 (Applicable decision rule). Let B ⊆ X be a choice experiment and
K be an epistemic component. A decision rule (D B⇐ P, T ) is applicable with
respect to K, if every precondition in P is justified in K and every constraint in
T fails to be justified in K.
Then, to determine which alternatives will be selected from a choice ex-
periment B it is necessary to consider all the decision rules from Γ that are
applicable with respect to the justified conclusions that can be inferred from
the active arguments of K. The set of acceptable alternatives can be defined as
follows.
Definition 9 (Set of acceptable alternatives). Let B ⊆ X be a set of alternatives
posed to the agent and 〈X, C, >C ,K,Γ〉 be the agent’s decision framework. Then,
the set of acceptable alternatives ΩB of the agent will be defined as follows:
D ⊆ ΩB iff (D B⇐ P, T ) ∈ Γ is applicable with respect to K.
Clearly, if B = ∅ then no alternative is eligible, and if B is a singleton then
there is no choice and the unique element of B should be selected. In Figure 3
we propose an algorithm for selecting acceptable alternatives from B given a
decision framework 〈X, C, >C ,K,Γ〉.
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Algorithm 1 (Compute acceptable alternatives).
Input: a decision framework 〈X, C, >C,K,Γ〉 and a set B ⊆ X.
Output: a set S ⊆ B
S = ∅
if B is a singleton then S = B
else
begin
for each e ∈ B do
if ({e} B⇐ {better(e, Y )}, {better(Z, e)}) is aplicable with respect to K
then S = S ∪ {e}
for each e1, e2 ∈ B do
if ({e1, e2} B⇐ {¬better(e1, e2),¬better(e2, e1)}, {better(Z, e1), better(Z, e2)})
is aplicable with respect to K
then S = S ∪ {e1, e2}
end
Figure 3: Algorithm for computing acceptable alternatives
Remark 1. Algorithm 1 implements a choice rule.
Note that this algorithm implements a choice rule as introduced in Section 2.
That is because the algorithm assigns to each set of alternatives B ∈ B a non-
empty set that represents the alternatives that the decision maker might choose
when presented with the alternatives in B.
Example 6. Given the set of justified conclusions from Kr = 〈Er,Wr, ./r, prefr〉
of Example 5: {better(box1, box3), better(box2, box3), better(box1, box2),
¬better(box3, box2), ¬better(box2, box1)}.
Consider now that Algorithm 1 is applied with B = {box3, box2, box1} and Kr.
Observe that if e = box3 then the rule ({e} B⇐ {better(e, Y )}, {better(Z, e)})
with {Z, Y } ⊆ B is not applicable with respect to Kr and therefore box3 will
not be selected. This is so because there is no justification indicating that box3
is better than another box. Consider now e = box2, then box2 is not selected
because there is a justification for better(box1, box2). Nevertheless, when the
algorithm considers e = box1 then box1 is selected (S = {box1}) because the rule
({e} B⇐ {better(e, Y )}, {better(Z, e)}) is applicable with respect to Kr with Y =
box2 and Z ∈ B. Finally note that no decision rule in DR2 of Γ is applicable
with respect to Kr. Therefore, the output of Algorithm 1 is S = {box1}.
In Example 5, the justified conclusions of the epistemic component Kr were
obtained considering a particular order among distinguished literals that was
introduced in Example 4:
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>Cr= {(nearer robot, nearer store), (nearer robot, smaller),
(nearer store, smaller)}.
We will show next that if a different order is considered then the justified con-
clusions can change.
Example 7. Consider again our running example (Figure 1), where B =
{box3, box2, box1}, now with a new order of distinguished literals:
>′Cr= {(nearer store, nearer robot), (nearer robot, smaller),
(nearer store, smaller)}.
That is, in contrast to >Cr , with the new order >
′
Cr the agent will prefer first
boxes that are near to the store, and then boxes near to itself and then the smaller
ones. With this new order prefr(A11,A6) = A6, and prefr(A5,A12) = A5.
Then, the set of justified conclusions in Kr is:
{better(box1, box3), better(box2, box3), better(box2, box1),
¬better(box3, box1), ¬better(box3, box2), ¬better(box1, box2) }.
And then, with this set of justified conclusions the output of Algorithm 1 is
S = {box2}.
STORE 
Figure 4: Two boxes with the same attribute values (Examples 8 and 9).
Example 8. Given the new scenario depicted in Figure 4 where X = {box4, box5,
box6}. We will use the following set of distinguished literals C2 = {nearer robot,
nearer store, smaller} and the order >C2 = {(nearer store, nearer robot),
(nearer robot, smaller), (nearer store, smaller)}. Note that >C2 prefers boxes
near the store, then boxes close to the robot, and finally small boxes. The epis-
temic component K2 = 〈E2,W2, ./2, pref2〉 for the scenario of Figure 4 will have
the following set of evidence:
E2 =

smaller(box4, box6), nearer robot(box6, box4),
smaller(box5, box6), nearer robot(box6, box5),
nearer store(box4, box6), same att(box4, box5)
nearer store(box5, box6),

17
A21 
b(4, 6) 
sm(4, 6) 
A22 
¬b(6, 4) 
sm(4, 6) 
b(4, 5) 
sm(4, 5) 
¬b(5, 4) 
sm(4, 5) 
b(5, 4) 
sm(5, 4) 
¬b(4, 5) 
sm(5, 4) 
A34 
¬b(4, 5) 
sa(4, 5) 
A36 
¬b(5, 4) 
sa(4, 5) 
b(6, 4) 
sm(6, 4) 
¬b(4, 6) 
sm(6, 4) 
¬b(4, 6) 
sa(4, 6) 
¬b(6, 4) 
sa(4, 6) 
A23 
b(5, 6) 
sm(5, 6) 
A24 
¬b(6, 5) 
sm(5, 6) 
b(6, 5) 
sm(6, 5) 
¬b(5, 6) 
sm(6, 5) 
¬b(5, 6) 
sa(5, 6) 
¬b(6, 5) 
sa(5, 6) 
b(4, 5) 
ns(4, 5) 
¬b(5, 4) 
ns(4, 5) 
b(5, 4) 
ns(5, 4) 
¬b(4, 5) 
ns(5, 4) 
A25 
b(4, 6) 
ns(4, 6) 
A26 
¬b(6, 4) 
ns(4, 6) 
b(6, 4) 
ns(6, 4) 
¬b(4, 6) 
ns(6, 4) 
A27 
b(5, 6) 
ns(5, 6) 
A28 
¬b(6, 5) 
ns(5, 6) 
b(6, 5) 
ns(6, 5) 
¬b(5, 6) 
ns(6, 5) 
b(4, 5) 
nr(4, 5) 
¬b(5, 4) 
nr(4, 5) 
b(5, 4) 
nr(5, 4) 
¬b(4, 5) 
nr(5, 4) 
b(4, 6) 
nr(4, 6) 
¬b(6, 4) 
nr(4, 6) 
A29 
b(6, 4) 
nr(6, 4) 
A30 
¬b(4, 6) 
nr(6, 4) 
b(5, 6) 
nr(5, 6) 
¬b(6, 5) 
nr(5, 6) 
A31 
b(6, 5) 
nr(6, 5) 
A32 
¬b(5, 6) 
nr(6, 5) 
Figure 5: Active and inactive arguments from the working set W2 of Example 8.
The working set W2 of K2 is depicted in Figure 5. There are fourteen active ar-
guments (white triangles) with respect to E2; as introduced above, arrows depict
the defeat relation. The details of active arguments are showed below.
A21 = 〈{smaller(box4, box6)}, better(box4, box6)〉,
A23 = 〈{smaller(box5, box6)}, better(box5, box6)〉,
A25 = 〈{nearer store(box4, box6)}, better(box4, box6)〉,
A27 = 〈{nearer store(box5, box6)}, better(box5, box6)〉,
A29 = 〈{nearer robot(box6, box4)}, better(box6, box4)〉,
A31 = 〈{nearer robot(box6, box5)}, better(box6, box5)〉,
A22 = 〈{smaller(box4, box6)},¬better(box6, box4)〉,
A24 = 〈{smaller(box5, box6)},¬better(box6, box5)〉,
A26 = 〈{nearer store(box4, box6)},¬better(box6, box4)〉,
A28 = 〈{nearer store(box5, box6)},¬better(box6, box5)〉,
A30 = 〈{nearer robot(box6, box4)},¬better(box4, box6)〉,
A32 = 〈{nearer robot(box6, box5)},¬better(box5, box6)〉,
A34 = 〈{same att(box4, box5)},¬better(box4, box5)〉,
A36 = 〈{same att(box4, box5)},¬better(box5, box4)〉
Note that, ./2= { (A21,A30), (A25,A30), (A23,A32), (A27,A32), (A29,A22),
(A29,A26), (A31,A24), (A31,A28) } are the conflicts between active arguments.
Note that active arguments A34 and A36 are not in conflict with any other
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argument. Considering the order >Cr then,
prefr(A21,A30) = A30, prefr(A25,A30) = A25,
prefr(A23,A32) = A32, prefr(A27,A32) = A27,
prefr(A29,A22) = A29, prefr(A29,A26) = A26,
prefr(A31,A24) = A31, prefr(A31,A28) = A28.
Since prefr(A25,A30) = A25, then A25 is not defeated and hence, A25 is a
warranted argument in K2. Note that A30 is defeated and therefore is not a
warranted argument. Finally, note that A21 is defeated by A30, and A30 is in
turn defeated by A25, then A21 is a warranted argument (for more details see
Definition 22 at the Appendix). Thus, the set of warranted arguments in K2 is
{A25, A21, A22, A27, A34, A36, A23, A26, A24, A28}. Hence, the set of justified
conclusions in K2 is
{better(box4, box6), better(box5, box6), ¬better(box4, box5),
¬better(box5, box4), ¬better(box6, box4), ¬better(box6, box5)}.
And then, with this set of justified conclusions the output of Algorithm 1 is
S = {box4, box5}.
In Example 8, the justified conclusions of the epistemic component K2 were
obtained considering a particular order among distinguished literals. When
considering different orders imposed on the distinguished literals it is possible
that the set of justified conclusions could change as we will show next.
Example 9. Consider again the scenario depicted in Figure 4, with the set of
alternatives B = {box4, box5, box6} but the distinguished literals with a different
order:
>′C2= {(nearer robot, nearer store), (nearer robot, smaller),
(nearer store, smaller)}.
That is, in contrast to >C2 , with the order >
′
C2 the agent will prefer first boxes
that are near to itself, then boxes close to the store and finally smaller boxes.
Note that the active arguments are the same of Figure 5 but the preference
between conflictive arguments change (see Figure 6). Then, with >′C2 we have:
prefr(A21,A30) = A30, prefr(A25,A30) = A30,
prefr(A23,A32) = A32, prefr(A27,A32) = A32,
prefr(A29,A22) = A29, prefr(A29,A26) = A29,
prefr(A31,A24) = A31, prefr(A31,A28) = A31.
Hence, the set of justified conclusions is
{better(box6, box4), better(box6, box5), ¬better(box4, box5),
¬better(box5, box4), ¬better(box4, box6) ¬better(box5, box6)}.
And with this set of justified conclusions, since box6 is nearer to the robot, the
output of Algorithm 1 is S = {box6}.
The precedent examples were designed to show the behavior of our proposal
in some selected special cases. Nevertheless, our framework is conceived to work
in a dynamic environment where the attribute values of the alternatives can
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Figure 6: Defeat between conflictive arguments of Example 9.
change. Every time the decision maker perceives a change in the environment
this event will change the available evidence. In a DAF, when the set of evidence
E changes, the set of active arguments of W can change, and hence, warranted
arguments and justified conclusions can change. Therefore, a change in the set
E can affect the set of acceptable alternatives of the agent introducing changes
in it; thus, one feature of our formalization is that there is no need to have
an explicit formalization of time. For instance, if in the scenario depicted in
Figure 4, box5 is moved next to the robot, this change in the evidence set will
change the set of acceptable alternatives, and the algorithm will choose box5.
As a further example, if in the scenario depicted in Figure 4 box6 is moved down
to the leftmost corner, the algorithm will choose {box4,box5}.
Next, in Section 5, we will present results that show what happens when two
alternatives have different attribute values and what happens when they have
the same attribute values. These propositions will be used to relate the choice
behavior exhibited by the decision framework with the choice behavior from the
approaches based on preferences and choice rules of classical decision theory.
5. Formal comparison with Classical Decision Theory
Hereinafter, we will formally relate our proposal to Classical Decision The-
ory. The first two propositions show what happens when two alternatives have
different properties and what occurs when they have the same attributes (i.e.,
they have the same attribute values for each preference criterion); these propo-
sitions will be used to formalize the choice behavior of the abstract decision
framework introduced in Definition 3. The formalization comprises Lemma 1,
and Theorems 1 and 2 which relate the choice behavior exhibited by the abstract
decision framework with the choice behavior from the approaches of classical de-
cision theory which are based on preferences and choice rules. For some of the
proofs in this section we will use some DAF’s concepts and notation [55]; to
facilitate reading, we have included part of this formalism in the Appendix, in
particular, the corresponding definitions for args(·), cl(·), int(·), pr(·), dialec-
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tical tree TF(·), argumentation line λ, and skeptical marking function me(·),
which are used below, can be found there.
Proposition 2. Let K = 〈E,W, ./, pref〉 be an abstract epistemic component,
X be the set with all the possible alternatives, and let x, y ∈ X be two alterna-
tives with different properties. Then, either there exist an argumental structure
Σ ∈ strK that is warranted from K and cl(Σ) = better(x, y) or there exist an ar-
gumental structure Σ′ ∈ strK that is warranted in K and cl(Σ′) =¬better(x, y).
Proof. By hypothesis, alternatives x and y have different properties. This means
that their attribute values differ in at least one preference criterion.
If pj is just the one criterion where x and y differ, either cj(x, y) or cj(y, x)
will be an element of evidence set E (Definition 5). If cj(x, y) ∈ E, then
(by Definition 5) there exists a primitive argumental structure Σj such that
args(Σj) = {Aj} and int(Aj) = 〈{cj(x, y)}, better(x, y)〉, which is active with
respect to E. Besides, an active dialectical tree TKA(Σj) will be built for Σj
that will consist of only one argumentation line λ = [Σj ], such that it trivially
holds that me(Σj , λ,TKA(Σj)) = U.
Conversely, if cj(y, x) ∈ E, then a primitive argumental structure Σ′j will
exist such that args(Σ′j) = {A′j} and int(A′j) = 〈{cj(y, x)},¬better(x, y)〉, which
is active with respect to E. Moreover, an active dialectical tree TKA(Σ
′
j) will
be built for Σ′j that will consist of only one argumentation line λ
′ = [Σ′j ], such
that it also holds that the marking function me(Σ
′
j , λ
′,TKA(Σ
′
j)) = U.
Alternatively, if more than one preference criteria exist where x and y differ,
two cases may hold:
(i) that one alternative (x or y) is better than the other one with respect to
all the preference criteria where they differ, or
(ii) there are at least two criteria according to which one alternative is con-
sidered better than the other one and vice versa.
Case (i) is a generalization of the case analyzed above, where x and y only
differ in exactly one preference criterion; and the result of the dialectical analysis
is the same. Only one primitive argumental structure will be warranted from K
supporting either better(x, y) or ¬better(x, y), depending on which alternative
is deemed better wrt. all preference criteria.
In case (ii), two types of primitive argumental structures are distinguished;
namely those supporting better(x, y) and the ones supporting ¬better(x, y).
These argumental structures will be organized in an acceptable argumenta-
tion line λ that can be decomposed in a set of argumental structures pro
λ+ = [Σ1, . . .] (those supporting conclusion better(x, y)) and another set cons
λ− = [Σ2, . . .] (those supporting conclusion ¬better(x, y)). If >C is a strict total
order, given two argumental structures Σi ∈ λ+ and Σj ∈ λ−, pref(Σi,Σj) = Σi
or pref(Σi,Σj) = Σj . This is due to the fact that in this case pref(Σi,Σj) will
never be , since alternatives x and y have different properties.
In this way, for Σ1 there will be just one active dialectical tree TKA(Σ1)
containing only one argumentation line λ, such that me(Σ1, λ,TKA(Σ1)) = U if
|λ+| > |λ−|, and me(Σ1, λ,TKA(Σ1)) = D otherwise.
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Corollary 1. Let K = 〈E,W, ./, pref〉 be an abstract epistemic component, X
be the set with all the possible alternatives, and let x, y ∈ X be two alterna-
tives with different properties. If >C is a strict total order and either conclu-
sion better(x, y) or ¬better(x, y) is warranted in K, then either ¬better(y, x) or
better(y, x) is also warranted in K, respectively.
Proposition 2 states that either better(x, y) or ¬better(x, y) will be war-
ranted by the epistemic component when two alternatives x, y ∈ X with dif-
ferent properties are compared; this means that it is always possible to decide
which alternative is preferred. In Definition 5, the features of arguments belong-
ing to the working set are introduced, and hence how a piece of evidence c(x, y)
activates arguments supporting better(x, y) or ¬better(y, x). Corollary 1 states
that when better(x, y) or ¬better(x, y) is warranted, it will also be the case that
¬better(y, x) or better(y, x) is also warranted; this corollary, complements the
above-mentioned proposition in the symmetry of comparing alternative x versus
y, or the opposite, depending on how they are presented in the facts available
in the evidence set.
In a similar manner, Proposition 3 below states that when two alternatives
x, y ∈ X have the same attributes, comparing them in the epistemic component
will result in warranting conclusions ¬better(x, y) and ¬better(y, x), stating the
indifferent preference among them.
Proposition 3. Let K = 〈E,W, ./, pref〉 be an abstract epistemic component, X
be the set with all the possible alternatives, and let x, y ∈ X be two alternatives
with the same attributes. If >C is a total strict order, then there exist two argu-
mental structures Σ,Σ′ ∈ strKA warranted in K such that cl(Σ) = ¬better(x, y)
and cl(Σ′) = ¬better(y, x).
Proof. By hypothesis, alternatives x and y have the same attributes, therefore
a fact same att(x, y) will belong to evidence set E (Definition 5). Thus, by the
definition of working set W (Definition 5) two primitive structures Σ and Σ′
exist such that set of arguments in Σ and Σ′ are respectively args(Σ) = {A},
args(Σ′) = {A′},2 with the corresponding interfaces
int(A) = 〈{same att(x, y)},¬better(x, y)〉
and
int(A′) = 〈{same att(x, y)},¬better(y, x)〉,
and which are active with respect to E. Moreover, two active dialectical trees,
TKA(Σ) and TKA(Σ
′), will be built each one consisting of only one argumenta-
tion line λ = [Σ] and λ′ = [Σ′], respectively, such that it trivially holds that
me(Σ, λ,TKA(Σ)) = U and me(Σ
′, λ′,TKA(Σ
′)) = U.
The results stated in Propositions 2 and 3 provide formal support for Lemma 1,
which states that given two alternatives x and y it will always be possible to
2See Appendix for notation.
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compare them in the epistemic component, whether to express indifference or a
preference for one of the alternatives (completeness). Besides, this lemma also
states that the epistemic component satisfies the property of transitivity when
all alternatives are pairwise compared.
Lemma 1. Let K = 〈E,W, ./, pref〉 be an abstract epistemic component. If >C
is a strict total order, then K implements 3 a rational preference relation %.
Proof. By Definition 1, given two alternatives x, y ∈ X, then x%y ⇔ xy∨x∼y.
From Definition 5, the evidence set E will contain all the facts of the kind c(x, y)
relating alternatives x and y (that belong to the choice experiment posed to the
decision maker) with respect to all the preference criteria referred by the distin-
guished literals in C. In this way, by Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 it will always
be possible to activate a primitive argumental structure Σ, warranted in K, such
that cl(Σ) = Z with Z ∈ {better(x, y), better(y, x),¬better(x, y),¬better(y, x)},
thus stating a strong preference () in favor of one of the alternatives. Con-
versely, if alternatives x and y have the same attributes, by Proposition 3, con-
clusions ¬better(x, y) and ¬better(y, x) will be warranted by two active primitive
argumental structures, which are warranted in K, thus stating the indifference
(∼) on the preference between the alternatives. Therefore, the completeness
property is satisfied.
In order to check transitivity property, we must prove that for all x, y, z ∈ X,
if x%y and y%z, then x%z. If x%y is satisfied, this means that:
(i) x  y: by Proposition 2, the conclusion better(x, y) is warranted given
that a primitive argumental structure Σi exists (active wrt. E), which is
warranted in K such that cl(Σi) = better(x, y), or
(ii) x ∼ y: by Proposition 3, the conclusions ¬better(x, y) and ¬better(y, x)
are warranted since two active primitive argumental structures Σj and
Σj′ exist and they are warranted in K and cl(Σj) = ¬better(x, y) and
cl(Σj′) = ¬better(y, x), respectively.
Similarly, if y%z holds, this means that:
(iii) y  z: by Proposition 2, the conclusion better(y, z) is warranted given
that a primitive argumental structure Σk exists (active wrt. E), which is
warranted in K such that cl(Σk) = better(y, z), or
(iv) y ∼ z: by Proposition 3, the conclusions ¬better(y, z) and ¬better(z, y)
are warranted since two active primitive argumental structures Σl and
Σl′ exist and they are warranted in K and cl(Σl) = ¬better(y, z) and
cl(Σl′) = ¬better(z, y), respectively.
If case (i) holds, there exists an active dialectical tree TKA(Σi) such that
3This term means that given two alternatives x and y it will always be possible to compare
them. In fact, there will always be an active argumental structure Σ warranted in K such
that cl(Σ) = Z with Z ∈ {better(x, y), better(y, x),¬better(x, y),¬better(y, x)}, depending on
the properties of the alternatives.
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me(Σi, λi,TKA(Σi)) = U where λi = [Σi, . . . ,Σn].
4 Given that Σn is the last ar-
gumental structure in the argumentation line, this implies that a distinguished
literal cn exists such that pr(args(Σn)) = {cn(x, y)} and no literal c′ ∈ C exists
with higher priority than cn such that c
′(y, x) ∈ E. If >C is a strict total order,
from Definition 5 it can be stated that y cannot be better than x with respect to
any preference criterion with higher priority than cn; if it could, then Σn would
not be the last argumental structure in the argumentation line since there will
be another structure attacking it and that is based on this supposed criterion.
Likewise, if case (iii) holds, then an active dialectical tree TKA(Σk) exists
such that me(Σk, λk,TKA(Σk)) = U where λk = [Σk, . . . ,Σm].
5 Given that Σm
is the last argumental structure in the argumentation line, this implies that
a distinguished literal cm exists such that pr(args(Σm)) = {cm(y, z)} and no
literal c′ ∈ C exists with higher priority than cm such that c′(z, y) ∈ E. Again,
if >C is a strict total order, based on Definition 5, it can be stated that z is
not better than y with respect to any preference criterion with higher priority
than cm. As mentioned in the analysis of case (i), this is due to the fact that if
another criterion with higher priority would exist, for which z is preferred to y,
Σm would not be the last structure in the argumentation line since there would
be another one attacking it based on this supposed criterion.
When considering cases (i) and (iii) together, it remains to compare cn
with cm to determine whether better(x, z) can be warranted; it can be the case
that cn = cm, or cn > cm, or cm > cn. Independently of how these criteria
are related each other, it will always be possible to guarantee that z is not
better than x with respect to preference criteria of higher or equal priority than
c′′ = max(cn, cm).
In this way, based on Definition 5, we know that c′′(x, z) ∈ E when x and z
belong to the same choice experiment, and consequently, a primitive argumental
structure Σ′′ will be activated such that cl(Σ′′) = better(x, z), pr(args(Σ′′)) =
{c′′(x, z)} and it will be warranted in K. This is due to the fact that an active
dialectical tree TKA(Σ) will exist such that me(Σ, λ,TKA(Σ)) = U where λ =
[Σ, . . . ,Σ′′].6
If case (iv) holds, this means that y and z have the same attributes. Hence, if
we consider this case together with case (i), it will be possible to build a dialec-
tical tree analogous to the one built for case (i), but warranting the conclusion
better(x, z).
If case (ii) holds, this means that x and y have the same attributes. In this
way, if we consider this case together with case (iii), it will be possible to build
a dialectical tree analogous to the one built for case (iii), but warranting the
conclusion better(x, z).
Finally, if case (ii) and (iv) are considered together, by Proposition 3 it can
be stated that the conclusions ¬better(x, z) and ¬better(z, x) will be warranted
4It is worth noting that in the case of n = i, it results in the argumentation line λi = [Σi].
5It is worth noting that in the case of m = k it results in the argumentation line λk = [Σk].
6Note that it could be the case of λ = [Σ′′].
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since two active primitive argumental structures Σ and Σ′ exist which are war-
ranted in K and cl(Σ) = ¬better(x, z) and cl(Σ′) = ¬better(z, x), respectively.
All in all, from the case analysis carried out above, it can be concluded
that xz ∨ x∼z, and hence x%z. Therefore, the completeness and transitivity
properties are both satisfied.
The previous results (Lemma 1, Propositions 2 and 3) are aimed at for-
mally characterizing properties of the epistemic component. As described in
Section 4, the decision component of the framework consists of a set of decision
rules that will effectively implement the agent’s decision making policy. These
rules use warranted information from the epistemic component to compare all
the alternatives belonging to the choice experiment posed to the agent. The
choice behavior of the decision framework is the result of this interaction be-
tween decision rules and the epistemic component; in particular, the following
theorem establishes the coincidence of the choices made by our framework and
the preference-based approach presented in Section 2.
Theorem 1. Let 〈X, C, >C ,K,Γ〉L be an abstract decision framework, where K
= 〈E,W, ./, pref〉. Given a choice experiment B ⊆ X posed to the agent, if >C is
a strict total order among elements of C, the choice behavior of 〈X, C, >C ,K,Γ〉L
coincides with the optimum one of a rational preference relation.
Proof. As stated in Section 2, an individual having a rational preference relation
% on X, will choose any element of the set C∗(B,%) when facing a choice ex-
periment B ⊆ X; this is due to the fact of her preference-maximizing behavior.
Besides, by Definition 9, ΩB =
⋃n
i=1Di, where each set Di contains the alter-
natives chosen by the applicable decision rule i. By Definition 8, a decision rule
can be applied if its preconditions are warranted in K, and its restrictions do
not. As it can be observed by Definition 3, decision rules in Γ have as restriction
that an alternative W will belong to ΩB if conclusion better(Z,W ) cannot be
warranted in K; that is, no alternative Z ∈ B exists such that Z  W . The
precondition of decision rules belonging to DR1 requires that the conclusion
better(W,Y ) be warranted in K (W must be strictly preferred over another al-
ternative Y ∈ B); likewise, the precondition of decision rules belonging to DR2
requires that the conclusions ¬better(W,Y ) and ¬better(Y,W ) be warranted
in K (W must be indifferent wrt. another alternative Y ∈ B). Moreover, by
Lemma 1 it can be stated that given the evidence set E, if >C is a strict total or-
der, it will always be possible to warrant the preconditions and/or restrictions
of the decision rules in Γ. In this way, in ΩB there will only be alternatives
x ∈ B strictly preferred or indifferent wrt. any other alternative y ∈ B; that is
x % y. Hence, ΩB = {x ∈ B | x % y for each y ∈ B} = C∗(B,%).
As mentioned in Section 2, notwithstanding their differences, under certain
conditions the PBA and CBA approaches are related. Below, we present a
theorem where the choice behavior of our framework is related with the CBA
and its principle of consistency in the decisions made, viz. the weak axiom of
revealed preference. To introduce next result, Algorithm 1 will be considered
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as the function µ(·, ·) with two arguments: an abstract decision framework and
a set of alternatives.
Theorem 2. Let 〈X, C, >C ,K,Γ〉L be an abstract decision framework, where
K = 〈E,W, ./, pref〉. Given the set B which contains all the possible choice
experiment, and function µ(·, ·) described in Algorithm 1, if >C is a strict total
order among elements of C, then the choice structure (B, µ(·, ·)) satisfies the
weak axiom of revealed preference.
Proof. As stated in Remark 1, we know that function µ(·, ·) described in Algo-
rithm 1 implements a choice rule. In this way, it only remains to check that
(B, µ(·, ·)) satisfies the restrictions imposed by the weak axiom on the choice
behavior.
From Lema 1 we know that K implements a rational preference relation
%, and by Theorem 1 it holds that given a choice experiment B ∈ B, ΩB =
C∗(B,%).
Let us suppose that for some B ∈ B, it holds that x, y ∈ B and x ∈ C∗(B,%);
so, from the definition of C∗(B,%), x % y. To check if the weak axiom holds,
let us suppose that for some B′ ∈ B with x, y ∈ B′ it holds that y ∈ C∗(B,%).
This implies that y % z for all z ∈ B′; but we already know that x % y. Thus,
by transitivity x % z for all z ∈ B′, and hence x ∈ C∗(B′,%). This is exactly
the conclusion required by the weak axiom of revealed preference.
As stated in the introductory section, the expected utility theory is a major
paradigm in decision making, in spite of its limiting characteristics. The ab-
stract decision framework introduced in previous sections shares some of these
characteristics. Both approaches assume: (i) that the decision-maker knows all
the options in advance of making the decision; (ii) that options are comparable
using whatever criteria the decision-maker uses; (iii) that the decision-maker
knows her preferences over these options in advance of making the decision; and
(iv) decision rules are independent of the options and preferences, and may be
defined in advance.
In this regard, assumptions (i) and (iii) preclude the emergence of options
or preferences in the decision making process. In complex domains, deciding
preference may be a computationally non-trivial task, and so it is by no means
certain that a decision-maker knows her own preferences for all combinations of
options. However, these limitations on our model arise because of the fact that it
was conceived in such a way its choice behavior was consistent with the classical
approaches described in Section 2. The main reason we have developed this
approach is that we agree with the position stated by Parsons and Fox in [48],
on the importance of formally relating argumentation-based decision models
to classical approaches to decision theory, for the guarantees exhibited in the
decisions made. In the following section, where related work is presented, we can
see that this formal relation is not accomplished in many recent argumentation-
based proposals.
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6. Related work
The use of argumentative reasoning for decision making has been investi-
gated in other proposals, and in this section, we will review those which are
more related to our approach. Most of the proposals to qualitative decision
making in argumentation literature (e.g., [3, 6, 46, 48]) share a common view
with respect to decision making, because they conceive it as a form of reasoning
oriented towards action. That is why, all of them consider the decision maker’s
goals or the expected values of actions, to decide which action to accomplish.
This is the main difference with respect to our proposal that is based on the
Marketing literature point of view [52, 53], where each alternative is conceived
as a product that the consumer (decision maker) is evaluating to buy (selec-
tion). This approach is detailed next in Subsection 6.1. Then, Subsections 6.2
to 6.5 describe main research lines in argumentation-based decision making ap-
proaches. Finally, Subsections 6.6 and 6.7 give a more general picture of the
decision making problem by connecting our proposal with other relevant ap-
proaches, namely, logics of preferences and utilities, and non-rational decision
making.
6.1. Marketing approach to decision making
To the best of our knowledge, the first work on symbolic decision making
explicitly following the point of view of the literature on Marketing in decision
making was [34], where the application of Defeasible Logic for automated nego-
tiation was investigated. In [34], decision making is performed as a two-stage
process formalized in terms of two correlated defeasible theories: the first one
for filtering the set of acceptable alternatives based on the buyer’s requirements,
and the second one, for choosing a particular alternative. In our proposal, the
decision maker is provided with a choice experiment which resembles the set of
acceptable alternatives built by the first defeasible theory mentioned above, and
we concentrate on choosing what we have called the “acceptable alternatives”,
which would correspond to the chosen ones by the second defeasible theory
referred above.
However, the filtering process accomplished by the first defeasible theory
of [34], could be naturally modeled with a DAF 〈E,W, ./, pref〉 as follows: (i)
The evidence E would be a consistent set of sentences of the form a(x), such
that x ∈ X, a ∈ F . In this case X refers to the set that is the first component
of the ADF introduced in Definition 3, and F would be the threshold criteria
set that would be used to evaluate alternatives individually. (ii) The working
set W will be such that if x ∈ X, a ∈ F and acceptable 6∈ F then, for all w ∈
W, cl(w) = acceptable(x) or cl(w) =∼ acceptable(x) and pr(w) = {a(x)}. (iii)
The conflict relation would remain the same as the one specified in Definition 5,
and (iv) pref relation could be defined analogously as the one of Definition 5,
by considering an ordering in terms of F instead of C.
If the proposed decision framework would be used together with the DAF
mentioned above to filter alternatives in X, the output of this DAF, let us call
it Xf , should be used instead of X in Definition 3. Independently of whether
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X or Xf is used, a key issue of the decision framework proposed in our work, is
that its choice behavior has been formalized with respect to the general theory
of choice of Classical Decision Theory and [34] has not.
Other works, based on concrete argumentation formalisms, that follow this
viewpoint to decision making, are those by Ferretti et al., [26, 27], where De-
feasible Logic Proramming (DeLP) [33] and Possibilistic Defeasible Logic Pro-
gramming (P-DeLP) [1], have been used, respectively. These two works could
be conceived as particular instances of the abstract decision framework pro-
posed in our work. The advantage of having an interpreter available like the
one built for DeLP [32], is that it makes possible to directly tackle real-world
decision-making problems (e.g., see [28]). Regarding abstract argumentation
frameworks, as far as we know, the one presented here is the first one proposed
for decision making having the aforementioned conceptualization of Marketing
literature to decision making.
6.2. Abstract argumentation-based decision making
A notable abstract argumentation-based framework for decision-making was
introduced by Amgoud and Prade in [3], where the decision process within the
framework follows two main steps. First, arguments for beliefs and arguments
for options are built and evaluated using classical (Dung’s [23]) acceptability
semantics. Second, pairs of options are compared using decision principles; these
principles are based on the accepted arguments supporting the decisions and
they are classified into three categories, whether they consider only arguments
in favor or against a decision, both types of arguments, or an aggregation of
them into a meta-argument. This work remains close to the classical view of
decision making in that it leaves aside aspects of practical reasoning, such as
goal generation, feasibility and planning, to concentrate on the issue of justifying
(based on argumentation) the best decision to make in a given situation; besides,
it has a logical view of decision that unifies the treatment of multiple criteria
decision and decision under uncertainty. As indicated by Amgoud and Prade,
in multiple criteria decision-making each candidate decision d ∈ D is evaluated
from a set C of m different points of view called criteria. Thus, two families of
approaches can be distinguished. On one hand, we have those based on a global
aggregation of value criteria-based functions, where the obtained global absolute
evaluations are of the form g(f1(C1(d)), . . . , fm(Cm(d))) and the mappings fi
map the original evaluations on a unique scale, which assumes commensurability.
On the other hand, we have the ones that aggregate the preference indices
Ri(d, d
′) into a global preference R(d, d′). Amgoud and Prade follow the former
approach while we follow the latter.
An interesting extension to the proposal of Amgoud and Prade, was intro-
duced in [46], where the use of the grounded extension is proposed as accept-
ability criterion for arguments supporting goals and where a new method for
generating decisions is presented. The proposed approach describes a method
for decision analysis in engineering design processes, such as those practiced in
the aerospace industry, but also the approach provides support to document the
reasons behind decisions for future reference (decision documentation). A novel
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issue of this approach is that decisions are modeled as sets of literals rather
than as single literal, as usual in argumentation-based decision making litera-
ture. This conceptualization of decisions which may partially overlap, results
in a more finely tuned set of decisions when argumentation systems have to be
built to derive arguments about the goals achieved when certain decisions are
made. As already mentioned, this proposal extends Amgoud and Prade’s ap-
proach and hence, differs with our conceptualization of a multi-criteria decision
making problem.
6.3. Assumption-based Argumentation approaches to decision making
Fan and Toni in [25] proposed two different formal frameworks for represent-
ing decision making, where this activity is conceived as concerning three related
processes: (a) representing information that is relevant to decision making; (b)
choosing the decision criteria to represent “good” decisions; and (c) computing
and explaining the desired decision based on the selected criteria. This work
differ from ours in that Fan and Toni use Assumption-based Argumentation
(ABA) [63], whereas we use abstract argumentation frameworks; moreover, and
more significantly, our approach uses pair-wise comparison between decisions to
select the “winning” decision, whereas in [25] a unified process to map decision
frameworks into ABA and then compute admissible arguments is developed.
A relation between Fan and Toni’s proposal and ours is that both approaches
guarantee to choose the best possible decision by constraining the underlying
argumentation framework through certain characteristics. In our case this is at-
tained by defining the epistemic component of the decision framework as a DAF
with particular features on the evidence set (i.e., the working set), the conflict
relation, and preference function (see Definition 5 for details), and in [25] this
is accomplished by defining ABA frameworks with different properties so that
admissible arguments in those frameworks correspond to strongly dominant,
dominant, or weakly dominant decisions in the corresponding mapped decision
frameworks, in this way, the decisions made exhibit an element of consistency
with respect to the accepted arguments in ABA. However, as pointed-out by the
authors in [25] it still remains linking this work to the existing decision theoretic
results, which in our case has been accomplished.
Regarding the last observation, Zhong et al. [67], pushed the proposal in [25]
one step further to connecting it to existing decision theoretic work; towards
that goal, they formally defined a decision ranking mechanism by giving a total
order ordering amongst all decisions, but the notion of rationality used relies
on the fact that best decisions meet most goals and exhibits fewest redundant
attributes (i.e., attributes not contributing to meeting goals). This leads to
the proposal of a new decision criterion, the so-called minimal deviation, and
its combination with two notions of dominance to select a decision result in the
development of two new mappings from decision frameworks onto ABA, in a
similar manner as accomplished in [25]. However, the main objective of [67]
is the proposal of an algorithm for generating natural language explanations
for decisions, on the grounds that existing approaches to argumentation-based
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decision making either lack automatic support for generating explanations, or
directly use the outputs of argumentation engines as explanations.
Another work related to the ABA framework for decision making is that of
Matt et al. [40]. The differences between this work and [25] is that in the latter
three different notions of dominant decisions (referred above) have been studied,
whereas in the former, only one was studied. Besides, one of the frameworks
proposed in [25] allows the introduction of preferences over goals, while in [40]
all goals were considered as equally important. All in all, these works together
with other recent papers on ABA frameworks for decision making [17, 19, 24],
have shown the suitability of ABA frameworks for dealing with real-world deci-
sions. In particular, in [17] besides ABA frameworks two other argumentation
formalisms are reviewed; namely: Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks [18] and
Value-based Argumentation Frameworks (VAFs) [10].
6.4. Value-based Argumentation Frameworks for decision making
Following the work on VAFs [10], in [12], the authors introduced the def-
inition of promoted value, a concept used to define the preference ordering of
arguments within the logical formalization developed for Atkinson’s analysis of
practical syllogism in [5]; in this work, the use of argumentation in practical
reasoning is studied, proposing a persuasion theory that uses argumentation
techniques for obtaining reasons for and against possible actions; then, in [7]
an application of this approach to a particular medical domain is described.
A significant difference is that, although the approach employs argumentative
reasoning to decide among actions, the work does not focus on a general for-
malization for decision making through argumentation; also, this approach is
integrated in a BDI architecture.
In Bench-Capon et al. [11], to model agent decision making in experiments
in economics, Bench-Capon et al. proposed a qualitative framework for decision
making based on the general argumentation approach to practical reasoning de-
veloped in [6]. This approach is also based on Atkinson’s account of practical
syllogism [5], where values that are promoted and demoted by alternative ac-
tions are explicitly represented by organizing arguments into a VAF. The main
objective of Bench-Capon et al. is to explore and provide evidence that in eco-
nomics an argumentative approach of this kind is a better device to explain data
from behavioral experiments than the classical approaches to decision making,
where agents are expected to be self-interested utility-maximizers. Towards this
goal, the Ultimatum game and the Dictator game were modeled, and then the
results were compared with results reported by humans with different cultural
background. The proposed framework is intended for use in situations where
agents are required to be adaptable; for instance, where the agent may prefer
different outcomes depending on the counter-parties is involved with. The con-
ceptual difference between this work and our proposal is that we present an
argumentation-based decision framework for agents behaving rationally as con-
ceived by classical decision theory, while in [11], the proposed model is intended
to provide a good fit to actual human decision-making processes.
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6.5. The Logic of Argumentation approach to decision making
Works such as [17, 19, 24, 25, 40, 46] can be considered as good examples of
the position stated by Fox et al. in [29] remarking the importance of developing
technologies to support decision making which are grounded on solid theoretical
foundations and not only on ad hoc methods. In fact, Fox’s position on this
matter can be traced to earlier works (see for instance [48]), where an important
conclusion is that when developing decision making models based on argumen-
tation formalisms, a key issue is to formally relate them to classical approaches
to decision theory.
In [48], Parsons and Fox delineated a proposal in the form of a position paper
which advanced the idea that argumentation constitutes a useful framework to
reason under uncertainty that can unify different formalisms, such as the possi-
bilistic and probabilistic approaches, and appropriately dealing with inconsistent
information; thus, argumentation can become the support of a symbolic model
for decision making in practical reasoning. Later on, Fox and Parsons in [30, 31]
proposed to use the non-standard logic LA (Logic of Argumentation) developed
by Krause et al. in [38] in the development of an argumentation system capable
of making decisions about the expected values of actions; the resulting approach
is similar to the decision theoretic notion of expected value. The system builds
compound arguments, following three stages to construct and combine belief
arguments and value arguments. First, an argument in LA is built supporting
that the state associated with a proposition C will occur if action A is taken.
Second, a mechanism LV (Logic of Value) simply assigns a confidence value to
C. Finally, a mechanism LEV (Logic of Expected Value) derives arguments
over sentences in LA and LV to conclude an expected value for A, consistent
with the value assigned to C. To choose among alternative actions, the expected
value is used to construct a preference ordering over the set of alternative ac-
tions. In this manner, in the context of having sets of arguments that support
different actions, the action with highest aggregated value will be selected; this
value represents the force of the set of arguments supporting that support that
action.
The main idea of our proposal maintains certain similarities to the line of re-
search followed by Fox and Parsons [30, 31, 48]. In both approaches, an existing
argumentation system for handling belief is chosen as the reasoning formalism
to develop a system capable of deciding among competing alternatives. Never-
theless, our formalization was achieved following different intuitions. Fox and
Parsons built a combined system LA / LV / LEV where the arguments promote
different actions; then, the supporting set of arguments with aggregated value is
chosen. The formalism introduced here relies in an underlying abstract dynamic
argumentation framework (DAF) where some components are instantiated and
others can be adapted to the application domain, and we have a set of decision
rules that work over justified conclusions.
Finally, both approaches are related to Classical Decision Theory but they
differ in the manner this relation is accomplished. Fox and Parsons conceive
argumentation as a symbolic model of decision-making and use as underlying
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argumentation formalism the logic LA, whose theoretic proof method to reason
under uncertainty is coherent with Dempster-Shafer theory. In our case, the
whole design of the framework contributes to get a choice behavior consistent
with the general theory of choice of Classical Decision Theory.
6.6. Logics of preference and utility functions
The notion of preference and its role vary in different disciplines; for instance,
in the above-mentioned approaches, we find applications of preference princi-
ples rather than philosophical foundations. As mentioned by Hansson [36], the
study of general principles for preferences could be traced back to Aristotle’s
time, but the first complete systems of preference logics were proposed during
the second half of twentieth century [35, 66]; since then, many contributions
have followed this this line of research [20, 22, 44]. As von Wright [66] stated,
the existing disagreements on the intuitions about underlying concepts of pref-
erence relations of various researchers into this field, can lead to the case where
alternative logics of preference can be built in correspondence to these various
points of view regarding the matter.
As Doyle and Thomason observed in [21], logics of preference could serve
as a useful way of organizing and comparing qualitative approaches to decision
making. Our proposal is not the exception to this claim and, in general, many of
the concepts and principles used in the framework proposed in the present article
are compatible (and could be compared) with similar concepts from logics of
preferences. In the same manner as logics of preference do, our approach allows
decision makers more flexibility in expressing incomplete or fewer preferences,
or leaving strengths of preferences unspecified [43]. However, unlike previous
sections where comparisons were focussed on other argumentative approaches,
a fair comparison between logics of preference and our proposal would require
more general criteria to compare approaches based on very different principles.
McGeachie in [43] addresses this last issue by proposing an interesting set of
criteria that could be used to compare computational properties of (very) dif-
ferent preference representations and their accompanying reasoning methods.
Those criteria include: (i) basic qualitative comparisons, (ii) complex prefer-
ences, (iii) utility independence, (iv) (quantitative) tradeoffs, (v) contexts, and
(vi) incomplete preferences. Here, in the context of the logics of preference, a
fundamental class of preference representations, termed ceteris paribus, is ana-
lyzed. Preference semantics in ceteris paribus allow specifying preferences that
apply the “keeping other things equal” principle, that is, they capture the in-
tuitive idea that unmentioned qualities in preferences might affect the decision
making process [43].
With respect to the above-mentioned criteria, the ceteris paribus assumption
proposed in [20] satisfies all of them except the context and tradeoff aspects (cri-
teria (v) and (vi), respectively). In a nutshell, that means that ceteris paribus
semantics cannot specify that more specific preferences override less specific
ones. Besides, they fail in expressing quantitative tradeoffs between variables.
Our proposed framework also exhibits this last limitation in dealing with quan-
titative tradeoffs; however, context-dependent preferences seem to be naturally
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captured by our argumentation-based approach. The direct ceteris paribus pref-
erences were later extended with explicit quantification of the “strength” of the
preference [62], graph representations of preferences [13], and trade-off ratios
between features [14]. Most of these extensions dealt with efficiency aspects of
preferences computation or tried alleviating some weaknesses of ceteris paribus
to fulfill the above-mentioned criteria.
The consideration of utilities constitute another mainstream in preference
reasoning formalisms which is based on modeling utility functions and comput-
ing maximum expected utility, following economic theory of humans as rational
decision makers. As pointed out in [43], this approach is effective, but can
be labor and information-intensive depending heavily on the accuracy of the
utility and probability estimates. Traditional economic utility functions suc-
ceed in many of the criteria considered above (criteria (ii), (iii), and (iv)) but
they cannot allow more specific preferences (criterion (v) related to context),
are notoriously poor with incomplete information (criterion (vi) incomplete in-
formation) and the computation required in many complex situations can be
prohibitive [43]. In this context, when considering the traditional approaches to
Classical Decision Theory, our work mainly differs in that the analysis is directly
addressed on the agent’s preference relation and not on a utility function that
represents this relation, as usual in these cases. This is an important feature
since to change the preference criteria in our proposal can be easily accomplished
by conveniently modifying the order >C . In contrast, in other approaches us-
ing a utility function, this cannot be performed in a direct way or even the
whole recalculation of the utility function might be needed; besides, consider-
ing the agent’s preference relation allowed us to establish a direct connection
between our argumentation-based decision-making approach and more essential
approaches to modeling individual choice behavior, such as the choice-based
approach.
Finally, some recent works have tried to get the best of both, quantitative
and qualitative approaches by proposing hybrid approaches that, for instance,
combine ceteris paribus preferences and utility functions [42, 44, 45]. That is
an interesting line of research that we will consider in future works.
6.7. Non-rational decision making
The preferences studied in preference logics are usually the preferences of
rational individuals but, as stated in [36], they are also used in psychological
research where the emphasis is on actual preferences as revealed in behavior. In
this respect, at present, there exist several research programs in psychology and
behavioral economics based on Simon’s criticism of mainstream economic mod-
els of perfect rationality (e.g., see [59]). As stated in [16], the decision making
research program in psychology was dominated by Tversky and Kahneman’s
approach (e.g., see [8, 64]) empirically testing Simon’s suggestions and showing
that they were correct.
Simon’s rejection of the assumption of perfect rationality, led him to develop
the concept of bounded rationality (e.g., see [60]). As suggested in [60], indi-
viduals are limited in their rationality for at least these reasons: (i) in order
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for someone to be rational, she has to fully know and understand the future
consequences of her decision-making in the present; (ii) nobody can know in
the present the future worth and the impact her actions will have in the future;
(iii) in order for someone to be rational she has to know all of the alternatives
(usually in decision-making the alternatives someone has in mind are limited
and humans are restrained from making optimum decisions). Considering that
our approach to decision making is influenced by the point of view of the litera-
ture on Marketing, only point (iii) related to bounded rationality in the choice
of alternatives can be related to our work. In theory, it could be the case that
B = 2X \{∅}, but in practice the choice experiments presented to the agent will
be a significatively smaller set; in this way, in the context of bounded rational-
ity as it was stated by Simon, the rationality of our decision maker is naturally
limited to the alternatives the agent has available.
Finally, it is worth noticing that there is also important research indirectly
related to our work. For instance, the distinction we make between the epis-
temic component and the decision component closely resembles Philippe Smets’
notions of credal and pignistic probabilities mentioned in [61], where an inter-
pretation of the Dempster-Shafer model is presented as the transferable belief
model. Besides, the game-theoretic semantics proposed in [41] is quite similar
to the underlying answer-set semantics of the DAF used to model the epistemic
component (see the appendix for details), since both are based on a dialogical
view of a process of argumentation that will decide which arguments are finally
accepted. In [41], this argumentation process (dialogical deliberation) will be
carried out by several agents, while in our case the process will be performed
inside the agent’s “mind” (monological deliberation).
7. Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we have introduced an argumentative approach to single-agent
decision making. The proposed formalism, called Abstract Decision Framework,
was defined as a tuple 〈X, C, >C ,K,Γ〉 and involves: a set X of mutually exclu-
sive alternatives, a set of distinguished literals C where each ci ∈ C represents
a different binary preference relation for comparing alternatives in X, a strict
total order >C among elements of C, a dynamic argumentation framework K
used for representing preferences relations and conflicts among the available al-
ternatives, and a set of decision rules Γ that implements the agent’s decision
making policy.
Our formalism is not attached to any particular agent architecture, and since
is based on abstract argumentation framework, some elements of the formalism
can be instantiated with a particular argumentation system. This is a key issue,
given that this abstract argumentation-based framework for decision making can
be conceived as a template for building decision frameworks based on concrete
argumentation formalisms. Besides, the resulting concrete instantiation, would
result in a decision framework having a choice behavior consistent with the PBA
and CBA approaches described in Section 2.
34
Our proposal takes advantage of the formalism of dynamic argumentation
frameworks [55], where the set of available evidence (that represents the situa-
tion of a particular environment where the agent is immersed) activates some
arguments of the framework, and those arguments are used for computing the
agent’s justified conclusions with respect to that evidence. For deciding between
conflicting arguments, the formalization relies in an order over the preference
criteria defined for the application domain.
In this article, we focused on the “argumentation-based view” to decision
making and establishing formal connections to Classical Decision Theory. How-
ever, as we saw in Section 6.6, other qualitative, quantitative, and hybrid ap-
proaches have played a key role in decision making research. As future work,
we plan to establish explicit connections with those influential approaches; our
studies will include a formal comparison with other qualitative representations
such as multi-attribute ceteris paribus preference statements [20, 22] and se-
mantics for extensions that support quantitative comparisons involving trade-
offs [44, 42, 45]. In this context, an important aspect to analyze is the compu-
tational burden involved in recompiling utility functions in some recent hybrid
approaches [42] versus the flexibility provided by argumentation approaches
that support numeric strengths in their arguments in the context of changing
environments. Therefore, to get some insights on this matter, it would be in-
teresting to model the decision making formalism presented in [27] (based on
P-DeLP) as an instance of our abstract framework. Also, to test its adequacy
as an abstract decision framework, other instantiations will be performed with
argumentative formalisms having semantics resembling a dialogical discussion;
for instance [49].
Moreover, as aforementioned in Section 6.7, new research lines arising from
psychology and behavioral economics are taking into account non-rational be-
havior in decision making based on Simon’s seminal works (e.g., see [59, 60]).
Nevertheless, as stated in [16], perfect rational models are still the prevailing
models; hereof, we have formalized the choice behavior of the proposed frame-
work with respect to the general theory of choice of Classical Decision Theory (as
motivated by Parsons and Fox in [48] and already mentioned in Sections 1 and 6).
As future work, following the thorough presentation in [16], we will also study
how our framework can be redefined to model some of the proposals concerning
non-rational decision making, given that argumentation-based approaches are
alike to human reasoning.
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8. Appendix: Dynamic Argumentation Framework (DAF)
We will introduce here the main concepts of the Dynamic Argumentation
Framework (DAF) proposed by Rotstein et al. in [54, 55]; this framework was
used in Section 3 to formalize our abstract decision framework. DAFs have been
built as a refinement of Dung’s argumentation framework (AF) [23], which is
defined as a pair containing a set of arguments and a defeat relation ranging
over pairs of them. The objective of the approach proposed in [54, 55] was to
extend Dung’s AFs to handle dynamics. To cope with this, it was considered
a set of available evidence, which determines which arguments can be used to
make inferences. In Dung’s approach, the consideration of a changing set of
arguments would involve passing from one framework to another.
In DAFs, the notion of evidence is a key concept. Evidence is considered to
be an entity represented on a logical language, denoted as L, whose sentences
correspond to facts in the domain, also this language will be used as the base
language to represent the arguments’ premises and conclusions. The arguments
supported by the current evidence will be considered as active; on the other
hand, the set of evidence contains those sentences that are undisputed in the
situation at hand. Likewise, arguments are considered the smallest reasoning
steps to be represented in the DAF; that is, the smallest piece of reasoning
that provides backing for a claim from a set of premises, as formally stated in
Definition 10. The complement notation will be used to state that a sentence is
the negation of another one: α = ¬α, ¬α = α.
Definition 10. Given a language L, an argument A is a reasoning step for
a claim α ∈ L from a non-empty set of premises {β1, . . . , βn} ⊆ L such that
βi 6= α, βi 6= α, and βi 6= βj for every i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
Given an argument A, we will identify both its claim and its set of premises
through the functions cl(A) and pr(A), respectively. Given pr(A) = {β1, . . . , βn}
and cl(A) = α, the interface of A is denoted as int(A) = 〈{β1, . . . , βn}, α〉. In
a DAF, given an evidence set E, an argument’s premise is satisfied if it belongs
to E, or it is the conclusion of an active argument according to E; an argument
will be considered active if its premises are satisfied. Notice that an argument
A not having enough evidencial support for all its premises may have active
supporting arguments for the remaining unsatisfied premises, i.e., active ar-
guments whose claims are the unsatisfied premises of A. An argument B is a
supporting argument of an argument A iff cl(B) ∈ pr(A). Let cl(B) = β, then
we say that B supports A through β.
The DAF imposes as a requirement that all the arguments be coherent. The
concept of a coherent argument is related to the fact that certain restrictions
must be addressed in order to consider an argument as a consistent reasoning
step.
Definition 11. An argument A is coherent wrt. a set E of evidence iff A
verifies:
• Internal Consistency: cl(A) /∈ pr(A);
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• Consistency wrt. E: cl(A) /∈ E;
• No Internal Redundancy: cl(A) /∈ pr(A);
• No Redundancy wrt. E: cl(A) /∈ E.
Definition 12. Given a set Args of arguments and a set E of evidence, an
argument A ∈ Args is active wrt. E iff A is coherent and for each β ∈ pr(A)
either β ∈ E, or there is an active argument B ∈ Args that supports A through
β.
Definition 13. Given a set Args of arguments, an argumental structure
for a claim α from Args is a tree of arguments Σ verifying:
1. The root argument At ∈ Args, called top argument, is such that cl(At) = α
and is noted as top(Σ);
2. A node is an argument Ai ∈ Args such that for each premise β ∈ pr(Ai)
there is at most one child argument in Args supporting Ai through β;
3. A leaf is an argument Ah ∈ Args such that there is no argument in Args
supporting it.
Regarding notation for an argumental structure Σ:
• The set of arguments belonging to Σ is denoted as args(Σ).
• The set of premises of Σ is: pr(Σ) = ⋃
A ∈ args(Σ)
pr(A) \ ⋃
A ∈ args(Σ)
cl(A).
• The claim of Σ is denoted as cl(Σ) = α.
Functions pr(·) and cl(·) are also applied to argumental structures. It is
important to stress that, within an argumental structure, if a premise which is
unsupported by the evidencial set appears more than once, that premise must
be supported by the same argument. Moreover, when the set of arguments
in an argumental structure is a singleton, the argumental structure is called
primitive. In DAF, the defeat relationship is obtained by applying a preference
function on pairs of argumental structures in conflict. As mentioned above, ar-
guments are the finest grained steps in the reasoning process, so it makes sense
to define the conflict relationship on arguments first, and then to extend it to ar-
gumental structures. This gives rise to the notion of conflict among argumental
structures; when all these conflicts are determined, a preference function decides
which argument (supported by an argumental structure) prevails. Given a set of
arguments Args, the set ./⊆ Args×Args denotes a conflict relation over Args,
verifying ./⊇ {(A,B)|{A,B} ⊆ Args, cl(A) = cl(B)}. Given a set Args of ar-
guments, an argument Ai transitively supports an argument Ak within Args iff
there is a sequence of arguments [Ai, . . . ,Ak] in Args where cl(Aj) ∈ pr(Aj+1),
for every j such that i ≤ j ≤ k − 1.
Definition 14. Let Args be a set of arguments and ./⊆ Args × Args be a
conflict relation, an argumental structure Σ ∈ Args is well-formed wrt. ./, iff
Σ verifies:
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• Premise Consistency: There are no α, β ∈ pr(Σ) such that α = β;
• Consistency: For each argument A ∈ args(Σ) there is no argument B ∈
args(Σ), such that A ./ B.
• Non-Circularity: No argument A ∈ args(Σ) transitively supports an argu-
ment B ∈ args(Σ) if cl(B) ∈ pr(A).
• Uniformity: If A ∈ args(Σ) supports B ∈ args(Σ) through β, then for all
Bi ∈ args(Σ) having β as premise, A supports Bi through β.
The domain of all well-formed argumental structures wrt. Args and ./ is
denoted as str(Args,./). Since a set of evidence is always consistent, a struc-
ture with inconsistent premises would never become active. However, as stated
above, it is useful to validate also inactive argumental structures. The prop-
erty of consistency invalidates inherently contradictory argumental structures.
The requirement of non-circularity avoids taking into consideration structures
yielding infinite reasoning chains. Finally, the restriction of uniformity does not
allow heterogeneous support for a premise throughout a structure. These con-
straints are defined so that we can trust a well-formed structure as a sensible
reasoning chain, independently from the set of evidence.
From a knowledge representation perspective, the objective of an argumen-
tal structure is comparable to that of its composing arguments: both support
claims from a set of premises. The difference relies on the fact that arguments
cannot be decomposed into smaller pieces. Conversely, argumental structures
can be decomposed into subsets (aggregations of arguments) referred as argu-
mental substructures, as defined below. Given two argumental structures Σ
and Σ′ from a set of arguments Args, Σ′ is an argumental substructure of Σ
(denoted as Σ′ v Σ) iff args(Σ′) ⊆ args(Σ). If args(Σ′) ⊂ args(Σ), then Σ′ is a
proper argumental substructure of Σ (denoted as Σ′ @ Σ). Given a set Args of
arguments, a conflict relation ./⊆ Args × Args, and two argumental structures
Σ1,Σ2 ∈ str(Args,./), structure Σ1 is in conflict with Σ2 iff top(Σ1) ./ top(Σ2).
The conflict between argumental structures is denoted as “^_”.
The preference function is defined over argumental structures and not over
arguments, since, in order to decide which argument prevails, all the knowledge
giving support to them should be considered. Moreover, when facing different
scenarios, the same argument might be active from different active argumental
structures and, consequently, the preference could change along with evidence.
Given two argumental structures Σ1,Σ2 ∈ str(Args,./), the preference func-
tion pref : str(Args,./) × str(Args,./) 7→ str(Args,./) ∪ {} on argumental structures,
pref(Σ1,Σ2) = [Σ1|Σ2|], determines the preferred argumental structure; if none
is preferred, the function returns the constant .
Definition 15. Given two argumental structures Σ1,Σ2 ∈ str(Args,./), Σ1 de-
feats Σ2, iff there is an argumental substructure Σ v Σ2, such that Σ1 ^_ Σ and
pref(Σ1,Σ) = Σ1. The defeat relation between argumental structures is denoted
as “⇒”.
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When a structure defeats another, the attack comes from the claim of the
former to any claim of a substructure of the latter. The attack is not directed to
an argument, but to a substructure, which is the actual portion of the structure
under attack.
Definition 16. A dynamic argumentation framework (DAF) is a four tuple
〈E,W, ./, pref〉, composed by a set E of evidence, a working set W of arguments,
a conflict relation ./⊆ W × W , and a preference function pref defined over
str(W, ./).
The working set of arguments contains every argument that is available for
use by the reasoning process. At any given moment, the set of active arguments
will represent the current situation. Different instances of the set of evidence
will determine different instances of the DAF; thus, when “restricting” a DAF to
its associated set of evidence, we obtain an abstract argumentation framework
AF in the classical sense [23], i.e., a duple with the set of active arguments,
and the attack relation between pairs of active arguments. This “restriction”
is called an active instance and it is addressed in Definition 20. Below, other
necessary definitions are introduced first.
Definition 17. Given a DAF F = 〈E,W, ./, pref〉, the set of active argumental
structures in F wrt. E is S = {A ∈W | A is active wrt. E}.
Definition 18. Given a DAF F = 〈E,W, ./, pref〉, a well-formed argumental
structure Σ in F is active wrt. E iff pr(Σ) ⊆ E and each argument in args(Σ)
is coherent wrt. E.
Definition 19. Given a DAF F = 〈E,W, ./, pref〉 and the set S of active ar-
gumental structures in F wrt. E, the active defeat relation over argumental
structures in F is = = {(Σ1,Σ2) ∈ ⇒ | Σ1,Σ2 ∈ S}.
Definition 20. Given a DAF F = 〈E,W, ./, pref〉, the active instance of F
is the abstract argumentation framework AF (S,=), where S is the set of the
active argumental structures from W wrt. E, and = is the active attack relation
between structures in S.
Every DAF, at any given moment, has an associated active instance, i.e., an
abstract argumentation framework AF; therefore, all the work done on accept-
ability of arguments and argumentation semantics for the abstract frameworks
can be applied to the DAF just by finding from its active instance the set of
accepted argumental structures. Moreover, since structures hold a claim, we
can go a step further and consider justification of claims, either skeptically or
cautiously. In this way, the study of semantics on the DAF relating arguments,
structures and substructures, it is not only faced calculating the active instance
but tools are also defined to directly calculate semantics in the DAF. With this
aim, as detailed next, dialectical trees are used.
A natural choice to obtain the supported conclusions from a set of arguments
is to resort to one of the many possible semantics developed for abstract argu-
mentation frameworks. In his landmark work, Dung [23] described preferred,
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stable, grounded and complete semantics based on the notion of the admissibil-
ity; subsequently, other semantics where introduced: ideal, semi-stable, stage,
and CF2, although the last two are not based on admissibility (see [9] for an
excellent introduction to the topic of argumentation semantics). An interest-
ing observation is that our formalism requires a skeptical posture regarding the
inferential result; that is to say, if the semantics chosen is not skeptical, we
would need to consider those arguments that appear in all the extensions of the
framework under scrutiny. In this paper, as an alternative semantics, we have
introduced an answer-set semantics which is based on a dialogical view of the
process of argumentation that will decide which arguments are finally accepted;
this approach will be formulated below.
An argumentative approach based on dialectical trees corresponds to the
intuition of a discussion around a topic. That is, the argumental structure on
the top of the tree is not only supporting a claim α, but also a topic of discussion.
In this respect, it will be discussed in terms of α, ¬α and additionally, the topics
introduced by all the argumental structures involved in supporting sentences,
since they contain substructures that might be attacked (see Definition 15).
Next, all the basic notions related to argument interactions are described to
address the formal definition of dialectical tree.
Given a DAF F, an argumentation line is a sequence λ = [Σ1, . . . ,Σn], where
each Σi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a well-formed argumental structure in F attacking its
predecessor. The root of λ is Σ1 and the leaf is Σn. Given an argumentation
line λ = [Σ1, . . . ,Σn], the top segment of Σi (1 < i ≤ n) in λ is [Σ1, . . . ,Σi] and
it is denoted as λ↑(Σi). The proper top segment of Σi in λ is [Σ1, . . . ,Σi−1] and
is denoted as λ↑[Σi].
As already mentioned, the exchange of arguments resembles a dialogical dis-
cussion; as such, it makes sense that the introduction of a new argument by
one of the participants should be consistent with her previously posed argu-
ments. Indeed, it is also desirable to require that none of the parties be allowed
to introduce an argument already posed by them. We will refer as pro and
con each of the parties involve in the dialogical argumentation process. The
following definition precedes the formalization of the intuitions referred above
on an acceptable argumentation line. Given a set S of structures and a conflict
relation ^_ ⊆ S × S, the set S is consistent wrt. ^_, iff there is no {Σ1,Σ2} ⊆ S
such that Σ1 ^_ Σ2. Given an argumentation line λ = [Σ1, . . . ,Σn], the set pro
(con) of argumental structures is composed by all the Σi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), with odd
(even) i values. The set pro (con) of structures in λ is denoted λ+ (λ−). Given
an argumentation line λ within the context of a DAF F = 〈E,W, ./, pref〉, λ
is acceptable in F iff the following restrictions hold: (1) Non circularity: there
is no repetition of structures in λ, and (2) Concordance: sets pro and con are
consistent wrt. ^_. It is worth mentioning that an acceptable argumentation
line is exhaustive if it is not possible to insert more argumental structures in the
sequence.
Definition 21. Given a DAF F and a set S of exhaustive argumentation lines
in F rooted in Σ1, such that S is maximal wrt. set inclusion, a dialectical tree
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for an argumental structure Σ1 is a tree TF(Σ1) verifying:
• Σ1 is the root;
• A structure Σi6=1 in a line λi ∈ S is an inner node, iff has as children all
the Σj in lines λj ∈ S such that Σj ⇒ Σi and λ↑[Σi] = λ↑(Σj);
• The leaves of the tree correspond to the leaves of the lines in S.
Dialectical trees are defined over the working set of arguments, and hence
they can contain active and inactive argumental structures. A dialectical tree
that contains only active structures is called active dialectical tree, and it is
denoted TF(Σ). Once a dialectical tree has been built for an argumental struc-
ture, a marking criterion determines which structures in the tree are defeated
and which ones remain undefeated. This criterion is specified by a marking
function. In [56] different marking approaches are described. As stated next, a
structure can be marked as “defeated” or “undefeated”. Given a DAF F and
an argumental structure Σi in a line λi in a dialectical tree TF(Σ), a marking
function m is m(Σi, λi, TF(Σ)) = [U |D], where U represents “undefeated” and D
“defeated”. A choice for this marking function is the one defined in DeLP [33],
where the evaluation is done in a skeptical manner; that is, an argumental struc-
ture is considered as undefeated only when all its defeaters have been defeated.
Given a dialectical tree TF(Σ), the skeptical marking function me is defined as
follows: me(Σi, λi, TF(Σ)) = D iff ∃Σj me(Σj , λj , TF(Σ)) = U , where Σj is a
child of Σi in TF(Σ). Once the marking function has been defined, the warranty
status of the root of a dialectical tree can be determined, as defined next.
Definition 22. Given a DAF F and a marking function m, an argumental
structure Σ from F is warranted in F, iff m(Σ, λ,TF(Σ)) = U , where λ is any
argumentation line from TF(Σ). The conclusion cl(Σ) is justified by F.
Naturally, if a different marking function is considered, the definition of
warrant consequently changes. The warranted argumental structures will be
determined by Definition 22, giving rise to the notion of semantics on the DAF.
It is worth mentioning that the notion of warrant is defined on active dialectical
trees, since all the reasoning only can be carried out over the set of active
arguments.
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